Political Corruption
Political Corruption

Concepts & Contexts

Third Edition

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Michael Johnston
editors

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Guide to Articles in Previous Editions of Political Corruption

Contributors
Preface

Corruption in Space and Time

Probably no period has witnessed the birth of more publications on political corruption than the closing decade of the twentieth century. The 1990s have also seen unprecedented expansion in relevant efforts at the measurement and monitoring, as well as mobilization efforts to control corruption. The latter activity in particular involved the mobilization of significant new forces in both the policy world and in academe. This volume presents a context for examining how this frenzy of activity has affected issues of definition, causation, and consequences of corruption. Thus it explores whether startling “awakenings” and crusades—after a generation during which corruption received relatively little attention—have exposed yet greater empirical and theoretical complexities for students of the subject.

As one of few volumes on corruption that can trace its genealogy to the period “before Watergate,” this compendium has been assembled in the belief that improved comprehension can be induced by understanding a broad range of manifestations over both time and space. Thus the contexts which are treated in our articles fall within a chronological dimension that commences in the early modern period, and also relate to geopolitical cases drawn from virtually all continents. Hence, we can clarify for the reader why in some Western countries corruption incidence declined between the eighteenth and the twentieth centuries, while in others it seems to have increased. Similarly, we can help readers understand why in 1960 corruption was seen in some West European countries as neither a problem nor an issue, and why such perceptions were radically altered in the 1990s, at a time when corruption practices were also changing in post-Communist Eastern Europe. Contrasts between corruption in Africa and Asia, which raise major questions about the social networks sustaining corruption as well as about its consequences, should likewise be made clearer, both by selections discussing those regions and others linking corruption to more deeply embedded aspects of development.
Corruption and Measurement

For some groups of scholars, the global corruption landscape has come to be even more radically transfigured. This is exemplified by the observation that where, in the 1980s, most transnational comparisons were largely impressionistic, the 1990s saw the dispersion of methodology which seemed to allow objective quantification of corruption incidence and perception in various national settings. But these breakthroughs were accomplished in the face of bypassing crucial conceptual hurdles, such as the definition of basic terms. Moreover, they reflected a range of interests and outlooks that, while bringing new energy to the study of corruption, also tended to "flatten out" the variations among cases, rather than probing more subtle historical, cultural, and linguistic issues. In a way the dominant measurement efforts became focused on examining the extent to which various test tubes were more or less full than others, while ignoring variations in their shapes, and in what they contained.

In addition to assessing the new methodologies, we seek to enhance insight by presenting more qualitative contrasts among small groups of contiguous countries. Thus, one chapter explores why corruption became more pervasive in Italy than in France or Spain, while another compares the corruption control efforts of Singapore with those of Thailand and the Philippines.

One of the ways in which we seek to couple comparative emphasis with the exploration of new ground is in the way we explore the relationships between party finance and political corruption. Previous academic studies have been hesitant to examine the interpretation of these arenas, but we believe that the time has come to face such challenges more directly. We must identify definitional problems, but not let them restrain us so as to allow the terms of debates to be set solely by publicists.

It is significant that the definitional discussion as to how closely corruption should be linked to the legality of electoral and other practices is being diminished at a time when the national legal frameworks are themselves being partially replaced or augmented by rules adopted at other levels of government, such as the OECD convention.

In the midst of those developments, European leaders have found their reputations entrapped in the shifting sands of judicial and public opinions. Thus the echoes of praise for national and European icons like François Mitterand and Helmut Kohl were still reverberating when new revelations led them to be condemned for having abused their dominant positions by directing corrupt side payments from cross-border economic transactions to subsidize party favorites. Several comparative articles examine in greater detail
how the unmasking of corrupt party finance patterns in these and other coun-
tries led both to divergent national aftermaths, and to the inducement of
similar corrective endeavors in neighboring countries.

**Disciplinary or Multidisciplinary Approaches**

Some of the extensive corruption literature published by social scientists
in the 1990s has been mono-disciplinary, as in the case of most publications
by international lending and development agencies. Other parts of that litera-
ture have been so directed toward policy lessons that key conceptual and
definitional questions have been largely ignored, as in many of the publica-
tions produced or sponsored by reform groups.

By contrast, political scientists like ourselves and many others have con-
tinued to rely on multidisciplinary sources in our studies of corruption. Ever
since its inception in 1970, this series of compendia has pursued a policy of
drawing upon the contributions of authors affiliated with any one of the range
of disciplines extending from history, economics, and sociology, to law, an-
thropology, and political science.

**Analytical Logic and Sequential Emphasis**

The analytical, conceptual, and descriptive contents in each of the book’s
fourteen parts have been assembled with a view towards maximizing coher-
ence and complementarity for purposes of teaching and research. But, the
reader will quickly recognize that there is method both behind our grouping
of topics and also the sequence in which they are presented.

Broadly speaking, the first six parts of our book constitute explorations of
conceptual and definitional questions across broad temporal and spatial di-
mensions. Our purpose here is to inform the reader about how structural and
ideational developments have culminated in the modern definitions of corrupt
practices, and why, as it has at times appeared to some, contemporary reform-
ers seek to impose these on obstreperous outliers.

Then follow parts 7 through 10, in which we seek to demonstrate that
deeper understanding is best served by grouping analytic and descriptive
concepts as data according to geo-political and regime-type categories. Here
the reader will find that the way in which material is assessed to answer
questions of causation and effect is somewhat different in part seven on
Africa than for Asia in part 8, or for the United States in part 10. For the
eclectic reader, this organization could provide options for how to bundle
chapters in diverse sections of the book in the course of an initial exploratory
sampling of the volume.
Finally, in parts 11 through 14, we pursue mixed strategies. The geopolitical dimension is present, but more variable. For the discussion of the connections between party finance and political finance we refer almost exclusively to developed Western countries, whereas the sections devoted to the analysis of transitional systems in part 12 draw on more variables found in countries with more disparate societies and political traditions.

The final two parts then tackle the broad range of intellectual and conceptual problems that arise when issues such as the incidence of bribery and corruption are elevated from the local and national levels—the locus of almost all previous studies—to the level of international debate and policy formulation. Here the authors contrast the ways the new impetus affected traditional structures like the leading national print media, and how the newly coined statistical artifacts were utilized to link local, national, and international opinion groups. The volume concludes with selections intended to give some preliminary perspective on the events of the past decade, such as the causes and consequences of major scandals and reform efforts, and the roles both of corruption in the global economy and of globalization as a force reshaping our view of corruption. What issues might prove most noteworthy a decade from now, we can only guess, but the trends and events analyzed in this final part help define the starting point from which this decade’s events will unfold.

Ancestral Archive

Regarded in alignment with its two predecessor volumes, originally published in 1970 and 1989, Political Corruption constitutes a distinctive combination of serial and originative publication. The editors designed this volume to augment some selected previous articles by soliciting, adapting, and translating new contributions. Among articles included in the two preceding editions, some have been retained, while the majority have been replaced under our system of rotating editorial content.

The roster of those who served honorably and well in previous intellectual exposures is an extensive one. It is not carved into stone, but it is recalled in the compilation of titles of the nearly four score previous contributions to the predecessor volumes which can be found in Appendix A. Classified by topic, this listing may prove helpful to some of our readers who are interested in observations by earlier cohorts of scholars.
Acknowledgements

Leading off the list of colleagues and students whose assistance we would like to acknowledge are Jean-François Médard and Holger Moroff, who from their home bases in Bordeaux and Bochum, as well as in meetings in St. Louis, Bergerac, and Paris, played crucial roles in helping us to translate broad goals into editorial reality. Their assistance made it possible for us to include the work of authors publishing in German and French, which on this account played a larger role than in previous editions. They combined these roles with those of authors and co-authors of several articles, following the example set by our esteemed colleague Victor T. LeVine, our co-editor of the preceding volume.

Considerable thanks are also due to another group of colleagues who helped to organize diverse formal and informal conferences at which concepts and ideas were vigorously discussed. Important among these was Yves Mény, the director of the Robert Schuman Center, who encouraged Donatella Della Porta to help set up the conference on political parties and corruption at the European University Institute in Fiesole in 1999. Another sponsor was Antoine Garapon of the École Nationale de la Magistrature, who hosted an initial meeting in Paris in 1997.

Valuable contributions at these and other meetings were also made by Ulrich von Alemann, University of Düsseldorf; Paul Heywood, University of Nottingham; Christina Landfried, University of Hamburg; Susan Pharr, Harvard University; Jean Cartier-Bresson, University of Reims; Leo Huberts, Free University of Amsterdam; and Mushtaq Khan, University of London, as well as French corruption specialist Laurence Giovacchini, and Irene Hors of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

Also very stimulating for pursuit of this endeavor were discussions with our students in courses on political corruption. At Washington University in St. Louis, particularly good critical discussion of various manuscripts were provided by Leora Addison, Michael Apfel, Paul Frederiksen, Omar McLaughlin, and Paul Sonderegger. At Colgate University, a dozen years’ experience of teaching and debating the contents of the previous volume with very able undergraduates shaped this book in a variety of ways; Michael Johnston also thanks the Colgate Division of Social Sciences for funding enabling him to participate in the workshops noted above.

Critical discussion of several of the articles was also provided at a panel on modes of comparison in the study of political corruption, at the World Congress of the International Political Science Association, held in Quebec in August 2000. Participating in that discussion were contributors to this book like Verena Blechinger, Tokyo; Eva Etzioni-Halevy, Bar Ilan University; and
Maryvonne Genaux, Paris, and the two editors. Valuable commentaries were also provided by Linda Dolive, Northern Kentucky University, Also very helpful in St. Louis were two students at Washington University, Noah Evans and Bryan Brody. To all, and to many others who have contributed to this work over the years, our thanks.

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June, 2000
Part I

TERMS, CONCEPTS, AND DEFINITIONS
Aristotle wrote that “there are three kinds of constitution, or an equal number of deviations, or, as it were, corruptions of these three kinds...The deviation or corruption of kingship is tyranny. Both kingship and tyranny are forms of government by a single person, but...the tyrant studies his own advantage...the king looks to that of his subjects.”

Was Aristotle, when he described tyranny as a corrupt form of monarchy, using the concept of corruption much as we would apply it today to an official who secretly accepts a bribe to decide a policy issue differently than he otherwise would have?

Carl Friedrich, following Aristotle, holds that both applications derive from the basic core meaning, which he formulates as “deviant behavior associated with a particular motivation, namely that of private gain at public expense” (chapter 1).

However, today this attempt sacrifices clarity to brevity, insofar as it leaves too implicit how or why behavior is deviant from which norms for those whose conceptions are not based on Aristotelian ideal types. Some institutional framework seems a definitional prerequisite. We have less disagreement with Friedrich’s formulation that corruption exists, “whenever a power holder who is charged with doing certain things, that is a responsible funcionary or office holder, is by monetary or other rewards, such as the expectation of a job in the future, induced to take actions which favor whoever provides the reward and therefore damage the group or organization to which the funcionary belongs, more specifically the government.”

How prevalent has corruption thus defined been in various countries over recent times? His answer is:

That corruption is endemic in all government is practically certain. That there are striking differences in the extent of corruption between governments which are formally similar such as Great Britain, Switzerland and the United States, all functioning constitutional democracies, is equally patent.

It is possible that a law could be stated that would say that the degree of corruption varies inversely to the degree that power is consensual.

Switzerland can be taken as an example of a political system where con-
sensual power was maintained into the period of industrialization and mass suffrage, so that in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, that country has reported very few cases of corruption. The Scandinavian countries of Sweden and Denmark have used different techniques to inhibit corruption, even in recent periods when the same political party has remained in control of local and national power over many decades.

How time-bound are these perceptions? If, for instance, we turn back to the eighteenth century, how were these countries ranked on corruption by Americans in the decades preceding the American Revolution?

We are not surprised to find that eighteenth century Americans regarded the British system of that period as “corrupt.” At the time Robert Walpole and his friends ruled Britain by assembling majorities in parliament, which they largely recruited through money payments and the trading of patronage favors. But the traditional English concept of “corruption” on which the eighteenth century writers built related not only to means, but to the ends of politics. It was the encroachment of the executive power on that of the legislature and of the elites it then represented, which constituted the core of the definition of corruption used by many Englishmen as early as 1700:

The executive possesses means of distracting parliament from its proper functions; it seduces members by the offer of places and pensions, by retaining them to follow ministers and ministers’ rivals, by persuading them to support measures—standing armies, national debts, excise schemes—whereby the activities of administration grow beyond Parliament’s control. These means of subversion are known collectively as corruption.

In the period in which American protest boiled up to culminate in the revolution, Americans echoed and escalated such charges against George III and his ministers. But how did they rank Sweden and Switzerland, countries not particularly allied with Britain or involved in North America?

Very differently from each other. Switzerland was regarded as a country which had not only maintained local direct democracy usages similar to those employed in New England towns, but had protected its local institutions and effectively resisted the encroachment of potential political centralizes or ‘despots.’ Denmark and Sweden, by sharp contrast, were seen as systems which had become corrupted because their estates had allowed the powers of their parliaments to be undermined by centralizing monarchs who deprived the nobility and citizens of legislative rights which they had earlier enjoyed. Their people and elites had failed to maintain effective checks on the wielders of power. The Americans believed that it had been lack of vigilance that had brought liberty in Denmark to its knees, for there is a corrupt nobility, more interested in using its privileges for self-indulgence than for service to the state, had dropped its guard and allowed in a standing army which quickly destroyed the constitution and the liberties protected by it.
Sweden was a subsequent case in point.

The colonists themselves could remember when the Swedish people had enjoyed liberty to the full; but now, in the 1760s, they were known to “rejoice at being subject to the caprice and arbitrary power of a tyrant, and kiss their chains.

The concepts of corruption employed by the American colonists partly anticipated the manner in which concepts and terms were employed in some subsequent American crises, but also relate to concepts employed by such founding fathers of western political thought as Thucydides, Plato, and Aristotle. They and some modern political theorists have employed the notion of the “corruption of the bad polity,” to characterize situations which they perceived as marked by the decay of the moral and political order. As Friedrich writes about one of them: “Rousseau was deeply concerned with what he believed to be the corruption of his age, and he looked upon himself as the wise man who must raise a warning voice:... Rousseau’s concern with corruption is primarily with moral corruption, and only indirectly with political corruption, as providing the setting for moral corruption.” Another writer notes that, “The arguments about corruption are scattered throughout the Western political tradition but a coherent theory of corruption has never been fully articulated.”

As some of the above examples illustrate, there may be some overlap between the broader ‘institutional decay’ concept of corruption, and the more delineated one which defines corruption in terms of the acceptance of money or money’s worth by public officials for misusing official powers. But analytically the two concepts are fairly clearly distinguishable. There will tend to be some “corrupt” public officials in most political systems which are not widely believed to be becoming corrupt in the sense of the decay of their vital moral or constitutional rules of behavior. But by and large even radical critics have come not to link the establishment of standing armies and the growth of national debts as indicators of political system corruption in the way that eighteenth century critics did.

At times shocking revelations about the misuse of political, and especially executive powers, have tended to revive the associations and partly archaicized usages linked with the concept of institutional decay. Watergate was a marked instance of that. When it became apparent that President Nixon and his White House aides had boldly abused the powers of their offices to undermine their opponents, the issue of corruption reappeared starkly on the American national scene.

The Watergate revelations revealed clear violations of political rules in the shape of a television drama, which seemed to come, “straight out of the American Christian literary tradition...revealing naked ambition, Christian piety, lust for power and tragic betrayal.” Americans watching it got the overwhelming impression that “all the president’s men were satanic minions,
that the president himself was villainy incarnate, and that the highest office in
the land had been lamentably stained." (Eisenstadt, 1990) In its drama and
consequence the Watergate revelations, leading as they did to the near-impeachment and resignation of the president and the imprisonment of many of
his closest advisers, far exceeded both the drama and political import of such
"normal" American scandals of earlier days, like Teapot Dome and Credit Mobilier.

Yet the prevailing definitions of political corruption by recent political
scientists have fairly consistently defined corruption in terms of transactions
between the private and public sectors such that collective goods are illegiti-
mately converted into private-regarding payoffs.

The intrigues and plots which composed portions of the illegal chain in
which operatives of the Nixon White House abused executive powers did not
clearly conform to such and similar definitions of corruption. By contrast to
the typical patterns of bribery, nepotism, patronage, misappropriation of funds,
sale of office, and the like, Watergate did not involve primarily private-
regarding payoffs, the president's tax returns and home remodeling notwithstanding. All the President's Men were not interested in private gain. Watergate
thus differed from such cash-oriented scandals as Teapot Dome, Credit
Mobilier, or the Agnew affair.

Many political scientists whose attention to political corruption phenomena ante-
dated the Nixon/Watergate period reacted critically to these proposed, more broad-
ened definitions. We are inclined to agree with a British colleague that the loose-
ness of contemporary definitions provides infinite scope for argument. Unethical
behavior or behavior which violates "the norms of the system of public
order" may include almost anything. The danger here seems to be that clarity and consistency
in analysis may have been sacrificed for comprehensiveness. The fundamental
weakness of the recent literature on corruption lies in the use of vague criteria and
inappropriate perspectives which distort, exaggerate or otherwise over-simply ex-
planations of corruption in the United States.

Varieties of Meanings

A careful examination of what past and present writers seem to have
intended when they employed the term corruption in political contexts re-
veals an even broader catalog of usages and potential ambiguities. Some
reasons for this become more apparent by referring to the Oxford English
Dictionary (OED), where we find that only one of nine commonly accepted
definitions for the term is applicable to political contexts: "Perversion or
destruction of integrity in the discharge of public duties by bribery or favor;
The open existence of corrupt practices, especially in a state, public corpora-
tion, etc."

The OED categorizes the nine meanings of corruption as follows:
1. *Physical*—for example, “the destruction or spoiling of anything, especially by disintegration or by decomposition with its attendant unwholesomeness and loathsomeness; putrefaction.”

2. *Moral*—the “political” definition already given comes under this category. Another definition in this category is: “a making or becoming morally corrupt; the fact or condition of being corrupt; moral deterioration or decay; depravity.”

3. *The perversion of anything from an original state of purity*—for example, “the perversion of an institution, custom, and so forth from its primitive purity; an instance of this perversion.”

The present usage of the term corruption in political contexts has obviously been colored by the meanings in the “moral” category, and in earlier times usage was frequently colored by the meanings in the two other categories, especially by those in the third category. Thus the author of a nineteenth-century encyclopedia article entitled “Corruption in Politics” developed his discussion essentially in terms of meanings derived by way of Montesquieu from Aristotle, who, for instance, conceived of tyranny as a “corrupted” variant of monarchy.

**Contemporary Social Science Definitions**

The variety of definitions employed by contemporary social scientists interested in corruption fortunately does not cover as wide a span as those given in the OED. Among them we can identify usages that seek to define corruption in terms of one of three kinds of basic models or concepts. The largest group of social science writers follow the OED definition and relate their definitions of corruption essentially to concepts concerning the duties of the public office. A smaller group develop definitions that are primarily related to demand, supply, and exchange concepts derived from economic theory; while a third group discuss corruption more with regard to the concept of the public interest.

**Public-Office-Centered Definitions**

Definitions of corruption that relate most essentially to the concept of the public office and to deviations from norms binding upon its incumbents are well illustrated in the work of three authors—David H. Bayley, G. Myrdal, and J.S. Nye—who have concerned themselves with the problems of development in various continents.

Corruption, while being tied particularly to the act of bribery, is a general term covering misuse of authority as a result of considerations of personal gain, which need not be monetary.
Examining the wording of American statutes relating to bribery, Lowenstein (Handbook, 1990) finds that one of five elements generally mentioned, that relating to the involvement of a public official, is least ambiguous. More open to interpretation are conditions that

i. the defendant must have a corrupt intent;
ii. that benefits of value must accrue to the public official;
iii. that there must be a relationship between the thing of value and an official act; and,
iv. that the relationship must involve the intent to influence or be influenced in the carrying out of an official act.

J.S. Nye (chapter 17) defines corruption as

... behavior which deviates from the normal duties of a public role because of private-regarding (family, close private clique), pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence. This includes such behavior as bribery (use of reward to pervert the judgement of a person in a position of trust); nepotism (bestowal of patronage by reason of ascriptive relationship rather than merit); and misappropriation (illegal appropriation of public resources for private-regarding uses).

Market-Centered Definitions

Definitions in terms of the theory of the market have been developed particularly by those authors dealing with earlier Western and contemporary non-Western societies, in which the norms governing public officeholders are not clearly articulated or are nonexistent. Thus Van Klaveren (chapter 5) states that

A corrupt civil servant regards his public office as a business, the income of which he will...seek to maximize. The office then becomes a—maximizing unit." The size of his income depends...upon the market situation and his talents for finding the point of maximal gain on the public’s demand curve.

Also pertinent is the statement by Nathaniel Leff (chapter 18).

Corruption is an extra-legal institution used by individuals or groups to gain influence over the actions of the bureaucracy. As such the existence of corruption per se indicates only that these groups participate in the decision-making process to a greater extent than would otherwise be the case.

Public-Interest-Centered Definitions

Some writers feel that the first set of definitions is too narrowly conceived and the second set too broadly conceived. They tend to maintain that the embattled concept of "public interest" is not only still useful but necessary to
illustrate the essence of concepts like corruption. Carl Friedrich, for instance, contends that

The pattern of corruption can be said to exist whenever a powerholder who is charged with doing certain things, i.e., who is a responsible functionary or officeholder, is by monetary or other rewards not legally provided for, induced to take actions which favor whoever provides the rewards and thereby does damage to the public and its interests.

Since the concept of the public interest is open to broad interpretation, it has been suggested that determination of whether a political policy-influencing action is or is not corrupt will depend on the observer’s judgment as to whether a particular policy is or is not desirable. But Lowenstein argues that acts that “are made according to the wishes of the highest bidder,” may be regarded as contrary to the public interest, without regard to the substantive direction of its influence on public policy (Handbook, 1990).

In the 1980s there has been a revival of attempts to employ the public interest concept to delegitimate particularly large-scale business financing of political activity by attaching the label of corruption to legal or quasi-legal activities. Accordingly, distinctions are made between “public interest groups,” which represent “the community at large” and whose focus is on “non-pecuniary interests,” and “special interest groups,” which have a narrow base and represent primarily pecuniary interests. Thus the financial allocations of political action committees have in the American context, been attacked, by Amitai Etzioni as exercising power through so-called “legalized corruption.” Plutocrats in a democracy work by corrupting public life. They seek to turn a government of, by and for the people into one of the wealthy....Political corruption is typically perpetrated by private interests seeking illicit public favors and finding quite willing public officials.10

In West Germany, where similar payments evaded disclosure requirements, similar charges have been made by members of the Green party. For political analysts this raises the question of whether they should blur the distinctions between exchanges that are implicit rather than explicit, and between those that are channeled through legalized organizations rather than through back-door contacts. Should “undue influence” become labeled as “corruption” when the means are used by a group that is seen as working less in the public interest than others? Arguments about whether social scientists should endorse or employ such broadened definitions continue to be vehement in both America and Europe.

Whose Norms Set the Criteria?

The definitions employed in the first and third of the categories just discussed directly raise the question encountered in all normative analysis: Which
norms are the ones that will be used to distinguish corrupt from noncorrupt acts? If the definitions are public-office-centered, then which statement of the rules and norms governing public officeholders is to be employed? If the definitions are public-interest-centered, then whose evaluation of the public's interest is to be operationalized? Definitions couched in terms of market theory appear to bypass this problem, but in fact they do not. They too imply that somewhere there is an authority that distinguishes between the rules applicable to public officials and those applicable to businessmen operating in the free market, or that there are certain characteristics that distinguish a "black market" from the free market.

Political scientists of an earlier generation tried to deal with the problem of norm setting with reference to the legal rules provided by statute books and court decisions. Thus behavior was judged by James Bryce to be either permissible or corrupt in accordance with the criteria established by legislators and judges:

Corruption may be taken to include those modes of employing money to attain private ends by political means which are criminal or at least illegal, because they induce persons charged with a public duty to transgress that duty and misuse the functions assigned to them.

But the author of the article on "Corruption, Political," in the *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* argued that "the question of formal legality...is not the essence of the concept." The normative judgments that should be used as criteria, he thought, were the judgments of the elite: "Where the best opinion and morality of the time, examining the intent and setting of an act, judge it to represent a sacrifice of public for private benefit, then it must be held to be corrupt."

Senturia's particularistic emphasis would require that this fairly large body of elites serve as a jury for each particular case. Their findings, in effect, would relate only to their society of that particular era. A consensus of the "best opinion" in a time and place, such as Britain in 1960, could presumably establish criteria beyond which private-regarding behavior would be considered corrupt in the contemporary setting. However, it would then be impossible to compare either the extent or the verities of political corruption between the situations prevailing of Britain in 1960 and in 1860 because of the uniqueness of the suggested definition. This difficulty would apply equally to attempts to compare, say, bureaucratic corruption in nineteenth-century Russia and twentieth-century Chicago.

Is there a term which political scientists could use as a synonym for corruption, which would include the meanings most relevant for them, while screening out some of those that create ambiguity, such as the one associated with the broader meaning linked with system decay? The term *graft* is put forward as one possible candidate. Although the exact origins of the term are
not known, it is clearly of American origins and was long regarded as an Americanism, as the OED Supplement records. Terms very similar to corruption have been taken over from Latin into most established languages, and this constitutes an advantage from the comparative perspective. (See Moroff & Blechinger, chapter 44.)

Although corruption is often exemplified with examples of bribery, it is generally recognized that corruption is a broader and more embracing concept. Bribery is regarded by many lawyers as a concept with relatively fixed boundaries, whose definitions centered around quid-pro-quo relationships. In American jurisprudence, the bribery concept has generally been held to be broader than that of a lesser offence like 'giving or receiving an unlawful gratuity (FN). The distinction between corruption and bribery which is found in English can also be identified in most of the languages, with some exceptions. For a more extensive description of terminological differences among major languages, and how these are reflected in journalistic usage, see the article by Holger Moroff and Verena Blechinger (chapter 44).

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Several articles in the next section elaborate different perspectives on the problem of defining corruption and related concepts and terms. In his article on defining corruption Gardner underlines the distinction between misuse of public office and outright forms of corruption. For instance, if a legislator votes for a bill which gives tax concessions to a company he owns stock in this would best be labeled as legislative conflict of interest, rather than necessarily of corruption. He also criticizes attempts to base definitions of corruption on legality and evaluates tendencies to attach the corruption label to legislation which one-sidedly benefits entrenched social interests, but notes that some people “feel uncomfortable using the term corruption in all situations where the political process produces policies which do not benefit everyone equally.” He also provides an initial overview of survey based and other empirical studies concerning perceptions of corruption which are contained in this book.

Philp’s article identifies five criteria of a core definition of corruption and identifies difficulties which are raised by their application. He critically examines the attempts to distinguish additional categories of defining corruption and tends to be critical of efforts to distinguish either a definition based on public opinion, or Thompson’s attempt to crystallize a category of institutional corruption.

Philp’s deconstructionist efforts are also directed at classical Greek terms, which he finds did not adequately distinguish between bribery and gift giving or receiving. This he attributes to the lack in the ancient Greek world of a fully developed concept of public office and trust.
Did the criteria of personal gain also apply to the extortion of sexual favors in places like seventeenth-century England? Philp explores this question with reference to the revelations in the famous diary of Samuel Pepys. Finally the author also cautions us not to apply the corruption concept indiscriminately, and in particular asserts that public office mal-functions like incompetence and favoritism should not be subsumed under the umbrella term of corruption.

The four chapters exemplify how discussion of definitional issues progressed since about 1970. Friedrich's article constitutes an early comment on the presentation developed in the Introduction, as it appeared in the first edition. Gardiner's chapter then synthesizes much of the academic discussion of the 1970s and 1980s. Philp in turn deals with some new contributions from the 1990s and broadens the theoretical format of the analysis in cross-cultural and cross-national terms. The Leys article, finally, reminds the reader what the state of play was like before corruption issues drew broader academic attention.

**Western Versus Non-Western Standards**

If one does not accept the criteria established by law or the norms of a small elite group as delimiting political corruption, how far can one go in delineating the relevant norms with reference to the standards of a more diverse set of reference groups and codes? At present this problem presents itself most directly for those social scientists who have sought to analyze corruption in developing countries where mores rooted in two very distinct milieu govern the standards of political and bureaucratic behavior.

It not infrequently happens... in developing non-Western societies that existing moral codes do not agree with Western norms as to what kinds of behavior by Public servants should be condemned. The Western observer is faced with an uncomfortable choice. He can adhere to the Western definition, in which case he lays himself open to the charge of being censorious and he finds that he is condemning not abhorrent behavior, but normal acceptable operating procedure. On the other hand, he may face up to the fact that corruption, if it requires moral censure, is culturally conditioned. He then argues that an act is corrupt if the surrounding society condemns it. This usage, however, muddies communication, for it may be necessary then to assert in the same breath that an official accepts gratuities but is not corrupt.

The problem of applying the concept and standards of corruption to developing countries is exhaustively discussed by Colin Leys (chapter 4), who builds on the analysis of the literature as it had developed by the 1960s, to raise and answer questions both of conceptual and empirical relevance. He criticizes some of the parallels drawn by earlier writers between develop-
ments in Britain and Africa. The British ruling class of the Victorian period is seen by him as having a clear if tenuous conception of the public interest and the duty they owed to it through their use of public offices. In Africa, by contrast, “the idea contained in the phrase noblesse oblige scarcely applies. There is no previous experience, and so no prior ideology, of the rules of public offices and institutions in relation to the public interest, in terms of which the private exploitation of public office could be rationalized.” This illustrates how developing countries, where definitions of corruption were rather peremptorily incorporated into new legal codes, differed from western countries, where changes in the moral and legal connotation of corruption evolved gradually along, with other processes of societal change.

**Corruption Contestation**

Analysts of political corruption over the past decades might tend to agree that “corruption” is a contested concept. Whether it is a basically contested concept is less evident. There is considerable overlap between various components of proposed definitions. Of the three definitional types suggested above, some have been candidates for deletion, while other writers have proposed additional definitional types.

Thus the 1970s witnessed persuasive arguments for recognition of a fourth definitional type, based on public opinion. The inflation of conceptual types has partly been buttressed by the argument that the needs of dealing with the theoretically difficult interface between political party finance abuses involving kickbacks is not served well enough through use of the three-pronged typology. The question, however is, whether acceptance of additional types of corruption definitions would contribute to solutions, rather than adding further complexity to the analytical problem. In retrospect it seems that the case for a distinct public opinion-based definition has not been irrevocably established.

The presumption that twenty-five years of varied corruption research could call for a reformulation of the three-pronged typology is reasonable. On the other hand, not much research has been both conceptually self-conscious and oriented toward coping with broader cross-language challenges. Most optimal in the new millennium might be an attempt to resynthesize the typology. Conceivably the typology might be reformulated while not expanding the numbers. Although there is no inherent virtue in small numbers, in this case the advocates of conceptual multiplication might be asked to shoulder the burden proving “need.”

Forthcoming typologies might also seek to incorporate elements of the directness or indirectness of the relation between exchanges and their policy outcomes. This dimension would apply particularly where donors are groups
and where recipients are collective political actors like parties. The traditional quid-pro-quo criterion applicable to bribery convictions of individuals could find their equivalents where recipients are parties. But donations to parties might also be found corrupt if they indirectly lead to policy outcomes that would shortcut or distort democratic processes of decision-making. Here judgment calls are of course much more difficult as an analysis of jurisprudence of the U.S. and German Supreme and constitutional courts has borne out (Burke, chapter 34; Moroff, chapter 36).

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5. Ibid., p. 64.
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